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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AWARD-COMMONPLACE
OR ANOMALY IN FULL FAITH AND
CREDIT PATTERN?
PAUL A. WOLKIN t
The general theory applied in most conflict of laws cases is that
the substantive rights and liabilities of the parties will be governed by
reference to the law of the state where the significant operative facts
occurred. In most instances the internal law of the forum is not
applied in determining these rights and liabilities unless the significant
facts transpired there. Moreover, in the ordinary conflict of laws situ-
ation, whatever one of several possible rules of reference is deemed
appropriate, reference will and can be had to the law of only one state
on any substantive issue. To this proposition there are few exceptions.
One of them arises in the workmen's compensation conflict of laws
situation.
I.
Mr. Smith is hired in state A and in the course of his employment
is sent to state B where he is injured while engaged in his work.
His employer's business is located in state A and Smith is a resident
of that state. Assuming that both state A and state B have work-
men's compensation acts, under which act may Smith seek compen-
sation? If the workmen's compensation acts merely created a stat-
utory tort, then the statute of the place of wrong, the state of injury,
would be the, only act applicable. Some courts initially considered the
analogy persuasive and adopted this view. However, most courts
applied the act of the state of hiring. This was regarded as appropriate
on the theory that the employee-employer relationship was contractual
in nature. Failure to reject the act of the state of hiring was considered
equivalent to an agreement between the employee and employer that
that act shall control, irrespective of where the injury took place. The
difficulties inherent in this view rendered it no more tenable than the
tort theory. A third view, resting on neither tort nor contract theory,
was necessary to explain the scope of applicability of the compensation
acts in the interstate situation. It was forthcoming: workmen's com-
pensation acts came to be regarded as a statutory regulation of the
employer-employee relationship whereby the expenses of industrial
accidents are charged to industry as an incident of the production
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cost. Under this theory, a basis was furnished for either the state of
hiring or the state of injury applying its act.'
Actually, by the weight of state decisions, recovery could be had
in the state of hiring or the state of injury on one or another of these
theories. However, because of a lack of uniformity among the various
acts and the desire of many states to have their acts afford an exclusive
remedy, the conflict of laws problem became pregnant with constitu-
tional issues. Could the state of injury or the state of hiring apply its
act in disregard of the act of the other state and still fulfill the obliga-
tions imposed by the full faith and credit clause? Could either state
apply its act consistently with the requirements of due process when
all that had taken place within that state was the hiring or injury?
These issues ultimately reached the Supreme Court of the United
States.
In Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Clapper,2 the Supreme
Court held that the state of injury could not allow recovery in a modi-
fied tort action, as provided by its compensation act, in disregard of
the act of another state where the employee resided, the employer had
his principal place of business, and the employment was entered into.
The Court pointed out that the duties in the state of injury were but
temporary in nature and that state had no defined public policy against
recognition of the act of the state of hiring, set up as a defense to the
action. Full faith and credit had to be given to the act of the state of
hiring which contained a provision precluding recovery in tort. Since
the state of hiring had legislated with respect to a relationship which
had arisen within its borders, it was not purporting to give its laws an
extraterritorial effect.
The intimation in the Bradford decision that the act of the state
of hiring, if that state had a legitimate contactual interest, would
govern although the injury occurred without its borders, became the
decision of the Supreme Court in Alaska Packers Association v. Indus-
trial Accident Commission of California.3 The employee, a non-
resident of California, was hired in that state and sent for the salmon
canning season to Alaska where he was injured. The acts of both
jurisdictions were exclusive. Compensation was sought and allowed
in California under its act. Finding that Alaska's interests in the
matter were not superior to those of California and that the latter had
declared that its public policy favored the application of its act against
I. Extended discussions of the theories of the nature of workmen's compensation
and case authorities appear in: 2 BEALFE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) §§ 398.1-
401.3; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d. ed. 1938) § 97; STU=ERG, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (I937) x89 et seq.
2. 286 U. S. I45, 52 Sup. Ct. 118, 76 L. Ed. io26 (932).
3. 294 U. S. 532, 55 Sup. Ct 145, 79 L. Ed. IO44 (1935).
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that of another state, the Supreme Court held that California could
enforce its own statute and need not give faith and credit to the Alaska
act. Neither did the Fourteenth Amendment prevent California from
applying its act. California was exercising its power over a status, the
employer-employee relationship, which had arisen within its jurisdic-
tion and which it could control, provided this power was not exercised
arbitrarily or unreasonably.
Whatever implication there was in the Bradford opinion that the
state of injury could not apply its act was soon negated by the decision
of the Court in Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident
CoMM'n.4 The employee there sought recovery in California, the state
of injury. His employment there was temporary. He was a resident
of Massachusetts, where the employment was entered into and where
his employer, a Massachusetts corporation, has its head office. The
acts of both states were in terms exclusive. The defense asserted was
that full faith and credit had to be given to the Massachusetts act and
this precluded an award under California law. California was per-
mitted to apply its act. Few matters, the Court said, could be deemed
more appropriately within a state's concern than an injury to an em-
ployee occurring within its borders. The Bradford case was differen-
tiated, since California considered the foreign act obnoxious to its
policy. "Full faith and credit does not . . . enable one state to legis-
late for the other or to project its laws across state lines so as to pre-
clude the other from prescribing for itself the legal consequences of
acts within it." 5
As a result of these decisions by the Supreme Court, constitutional
sanction was" given to the practice of the states allowing compensation
either in the state of injury or the state of hiring, provided the partic-
ular state preferred the remedy afforded by its act to the one under the
foreign act. A majority of the states were, however, a step ahead of
these decisions. They permitted recoveries in both the state of injury
and the state of hiring, recovery in the second state being limited to
the excess of what that state allowed over the first state's award.6 The
4. 306 U. S. 493, 59 Sup. Ct. 629, 83 L. Ed. 94o (1939).
5. Id. at 504-505, 59 Sup. Ct. at 634, 83 L. Ed. at 946.
6. Mr. Justice Black cites in his dissenting opinion in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Hunt, 320 U. S. 430, 458, 64 Sup. Ct. 208, 219, 88 L. Ed. 161, 176-177 (1943), the stat-
utes of Florida, FLA. STAT. (194) § 44o.o9 (I) ; Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. (Park et
al., 1936) tit 114, § 411; Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE (Flack, 1939) art. 101, § 8o (3);
Ohio, OHIO CODE ANN. (Throckmorton, Supp. 1943) § 1465-68; North Carolina, N.
C. CODE ANN. (Michie and Sublett, 1939) § 8o8i (rr); South Carolina, S. C. CODE
(942) § 7035-39; Virginia, VA. CoDE ANN. (1942) § 1887 (37) ; and decisions in Gil-
bert v. Des Lauriers Column Mould Co., Inc., i8o App. Div. 59, 167 N. Y. S. 274
(1917) ; Interstate Power Co. v. Industrial Commission, 2o3 Wis. 466, 234 N. W. 889
(193) ; McLaughlin's Case, 274 Mass. 217, 174 N. E. 338 (1931 ; Migues' Case, 281
Mass. 373, 183 N. E. 847 (1933). See also, Note (1943) 57 HARV. L. REv. 242, 246-
247; 2 BEALE, op. Cit. supra note I, at § 403.1 ; GOODRICH, op. cd. supra note I, at 243;
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constitutionality of this practice received the Supreme Court's first
attention in Magnolia Petroleum Company v. Hunt.
7
Ii.
Hunt, a resident of Louisiana, was hired by the Magnolia Petro-
leum Company in that state. In the course of his employment he went
to Texas and was injured there while engaged in his work. Texas
awarded him compensation for the injury under its act. Thereafter
he sought compensation, for the same injury, in Louisiana, under its
act. The Texas award was interposed as a bar to further recovery
and the full faith and credit clause invoked. The Louisiana court gave
judgment in favor of Hunt, after deducting the Texas payments.
Successive appeals in the state courts failed.8 Certiorari was granted
by the Supreme Court of the United States,9 which, by a five to four
decision, reversed the judgment of the Louisiana court.'
The majority opinion 11 found that in Texas a final award for
compensation under the Texas act has the same effect as a judgment
and is res judicata as to all matters which were litigated or could have
been litigated. Since there was one injury to the employee in the
course of employment there was but one cause of action which merged
into the judgment. 12 For the purposes of full faith and credit, since
the matter is res judicata in Texas, it must be given the same effect
elsewhere, as in the case of any other judgment for money in a civil
action; neither Louisiana's interest in the matter, its laws, nor its pol-
icy, affords any basis for allowing it to avoid this requirement of full
faith and credit.
The dissenters 13 did not believe that the Texas award was in-
tended by Texas to be res judicata of anything but a recovery under
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (934) § 403, followed by the New Jersey court in
Miller v. National Chair Co., 127 N. J. L. 414, 22 A. (2d) 804 (194), affirmed by the
Court of Errors and Appeals, 129 N. J. L. 98, 28 A. (2d) 125, (1942), on the opinion
of the lower court. Contra: Hughey v. Ware, 34 N. M. 29, 276 P. 27 (1929) ; Minto
v. Hitchings & Co., 2o4 App. Div. 661, 198 N. Y. Supp. 61o (1923) ; see also Tidwell
v. Chattanooga Boiler & T. Co., 163 Tenn. 42o, 43 S. W. (2d) 221 (1931), rehearing
denied, 163 Tenn. 648, 45 S. W. (2d) 528 (1932) ; De Gray v. Miller Bros. Const. Co.,
Inc., io6 Vt. 259, 173 At. 556 (I934).
7. 320 U. S. 430, 64 Sup. Ct. 208, 88 L. Ed. 16I (94,3).
8. The Louisiana Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court below, 1o
S. (2d) 109 (1943), and the Louisiana Supreme Court refused writs of certiorari and
review.
9. 319 U. S. 734, 63 Sup. Ct. 1O31, 87 L. Ed. 1695 (1943).
10. 320 U. S. 430, 64 Sup. Ct. 208, 88 L. Ed. 161 (I943).
II. Chief Justice Stone wrote the majority opinion, and Justices Roberts, Reed,
Frankfurter and Jackson voted with him.
12. But see RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS (1942) C. 3, Introductory Note. The con-
clusiveness of a judgment as to facts litigated is but one aspect of res judicata.
13. There were two dissenting opinions: one by Mr. justice Douglas, in which
Mr. Justice Murphy joined; the other by Mr. Justice Black, in which Justices Doug-
las, Murphy and Rutledge concurred.
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Texas law. Hence, even if full faith and credit were required to be
given to the Texas award, it was not res judicata, in Texas, to the
extent that it would bar a recovery under the Louisiana act. However,
further than this, they did not think that any constitutional question
was involved, but that the matter was so much a question of state
interest, state policy, that a given state's policy should be decided by
its legislature and its courts. "The argument of state interest is
hardly less compelling when Louisiana chooses to reject as decisive of
the issues of the case a foreign judgment than when it rejects a foreign
statute." 14
Were the Court concerned with an ordinary judgment in a civil
action for money, little criticism, if any, could be levelled at the major-
ity's opinion. The state in which enforcement of the judgment was
sought or in which it was set up as a bar to further recovery, would,
under the compulsion of full faith and credit, have to give to the judg-
ment the same effect that it had in the state of rendition. Local public
policy,1 laws,16 and procedural handicaps,' 7 are unavailing to escape
this obligation. These propositions, so firmly established by precedent,
unless they are now to be discarded, smash to smithereens the broad
blade wielded by Mr. Justice Black in the second part of his dissent.
State interest and policy, no matter how vital, do not enable a state to
deny to a valid judgment on the merits, as distinguished from a claim
which has not so ripened,' 8 the same effect that it has in the state of
rendition.' 9 Perhaps the most vivid example of the numerous instances
cited by the majority as illustrations of this is Fauntelroy v. Lum 
2 0
14. 320 U. S. 430, 456, 64 Sup. Ct. 2o8, 221, 88 L. Ed. 161, 175 (1943).
15. Fauntle'roy v. Lum, 2io U. S. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. 641, 52 L. Ed. 1O39 (i9o8);
Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U. S. 268, 56 Sup. Ct. 229, 8o L. Ed. 220
(1935) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (1934) § 446.
i6. Titus v. Wallick, 3o6 U. S. 282, 291, 59 Sup. Ct. 557, 562, 83 L. Ed. 653, 659
(1939) ; Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. 641, 52 L. Ed. 1039 (19o8).
See also cases cited in next footnote.
17. Kenney, Administrator of Kenney v. Supreme Lodge of the World, Loyal Or-
der of Moose, 252 U. S. 411, 40 Sup. Ct. 371, 64 L. Ed. 638 (1920); Roche v. Mc-
Donald, 275 U. S. 449, 48 Sup. Ct 142, 72 L. Ed. 142 (1928).
18. See footnotes 25 and 26 infra. Nor need the forum always recognize a claim
predicated on a foreign statute. "The full faith and credit clause and the Act of Con-
gress implementing it have, for most purposes, placed a judgment on a different*footing
from a statute of one state, judicial recognition of which is sought in another." Stone,
C. J., in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430, 437, 64 Sup. Ct. 208, 213, 88
L. Ed. 161, 165 (1943). See Hilpert and Cooley, The Federal Constitution and The
Choice of Law (1939) 25 WASH. U. L. Q. 27, 31 et seq.; Moore and Oglebay, The
Supreme Court and Full Faith and Credit (1943) 29 VA. L. REv. 557, 6o5-613.
19. For possible exceptions, see cases cited in footnote 4 of the majority opinion,
320 U. S. 430, 438, 64 Sup. Ct. 2o8, 213, 88 L. Ed. 16i, 166 (1943), and dissenting opin-
ion of Chief Justice Stone in Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U. S: 202, 213, 216-218,
54 Sup. Ct. 181, 185, i86-187, 78 L. Ed. 269, 276, 278-279 (I933) ; Moore and Oglebay,
loc. cit. supra note I8, at 571, 577-605. But note the reservation of approval in the
language used in the Magnolia decision: "Even though we assume for present pur-
poses . . . that there may be exceptional cases in which the judgment of one state
.may not override the laws and policy of another, . . ." Cf. dissent in Yarborough
v. Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202, 213, 54 Sup. Ct. 181, I85, 78 L. Ed. 269, 276 (933).
20. 210 U. S. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. 641, 52 L. Ed. io39.
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where full faith and credit had to be given to a judgment of a sister state
upon a gambling debt, even though the debt was incurred in the state
where enforcement of the judgment was sought and was not a valid,
legally enforcible obligation under its law. Were the rule otherwise,
the mere fact of state interest in the operative facts would enable a state
to disregard the consequences of a valid judgment of a sister state and
thus destroy the very purpose of the full faith and credit clause as a
"unifying force" 21 among the forty-eight states.2 2  Certainly, Louisi-
ana's interests in the Magnolia case, are, as such, no more vital than the
interests of Mississippi in Fauntelroy v. Lum or of the other states in
the instances cited. The bare fact of that interest affords, alone, no
basis for distinguishing an award in compensation from any other
ordinary judgment for the purposes of full faith and credit.
However, a salient point of difference between a final award in
compensation and an ordinary judgment may be found in the choice of
law approach to the two underlying claims as they occur in the conflict
of laws situation. In the ordinary civil action, as in tort or contract,
where some of the operative facts occur in the state of the forum and
some elsewhere, the forum may have a choice of several possible rules
of reference. Thus, in determining the validity of a contract, the forum
might decide that the law of the place of making the contract or the
law of the place of performance or the law intended by the parties to
the contract governs.23  But, in the final analysis, only one of these
rules will be applied; choice of one rule automatically precludes appli-
cation of any other rule of reference. 24  Whatever yule of reference is
deemed appropriate, reference will and can be had only to the law of one
state to determine the substantive rights and liabilities of the parties on
any one issue. If that state is one bther than the forum, then what the
result would be under the internal law of the forum becomes imma-
terial. Of course, under certain circumstances, the forum may deny
recovery although under the law of the state indicated by the rule of
reference there may be a clear case of liability. The forum's procedural
limitations, 25 public policy and interest in the subject-matter 26 are
instances. But, although these considerations afford a basis for the
21. 320 U. S. 430, 439, 64 Sup. Ct. 2o8, 213-214, 88 L. Ed. 161, 166 (1943).
22. See Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U. S. 268, 276, 277 (I935).
23. GooDmRCH, op. cit. supra note I, at § lO7.
24. But cf., the choice of law problems arising in cases of multiple incorporation.
See Steckler v. Pennroad Corporation, 136 F. (2d) 197 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943), cert.
denied, 320 U. S. 757 (i943).
25. E. g., Slater v. Mexican National Railroad Company, 194 U. S. 120, 24 Sup.
Ct. 581, 48 L. Ed. 9oo (igoi); REsTATEMiENT, CONFLicr OF LAws (1934) §§6o3, 6o8.
If, to obtain an award for compensation under an act of a state resort to specially pro-
vided administrative procedure is necessary, an action for compensation cannot be main-
tained except in that state. STUMBERG, loc. cit. supra note I, at 197.
26. Union Trust Company v. Grosman, 245 U. S. 412, 38 Sup. Ct. 147, 62 L. Ed.
368 (1918) ; Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 12o N. E. 198 (igi).
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forum not permitting recovery on a foreign cause of action, it is impor-
tant to note for present purposes that recovery will be denied in these
instances, not because the significant operative facts occurred in the
forum and under the forum's law no cause of action arose, but merely
because suit was brought, in the first instance, in the forum.
If a claim for workmen's compensation were merely a tort or con-
tract claim, the choice of law problem would be the same as that in a
tort or contract conflict of laws case. Whether there was an enforc-
ible right to compensation could be determined by reference to the law
of only one state, irrespective of where suit was brought. But, as has
been indicated, such notions have been refuted by the practice of the
courts in allowing compensation in either the state of injury or hiring,
by the many authorities which have critically examined these theories,
and by the Supreme Court of the United States. The decisions in the
Alaska Packers and Pacific Employers cases, conclusively establish that
the workmen's compensation conflict of laws situation is one of the
instances 27 in the conflict of laws where more than one state is con-
stitutionally empowered to determine the legal consequences of a single
event by the application of its internal law, as distinguished from its
conflict of laws rule, governing the subject. The legal justification for
this result is the power of each state to determine the consequences of
events which transpire within its borders and in which it has a govern-
mental interest .2  The factual justification is two sets of operative
facts, one in each state. Common to both states is the relationship of
employer and employee. Peculiar to each is the governmental interest
in that relationship as determined by local industrial, social and eco-
nomic conditions. In one state the relationship was created. In the
other state the employee was injured.2 9 When, following an injury,
the employee seeks compensation, in each state a different coterie of
facts superimposed on a common base renders each act applicable. It
would thus seem that each state is adjudicating something distinct and
that the process of allowing an award in one state is not a determination
which precludes an award, predicated on different facts which have not
been litigated, in another state.
The majority opinion in the Magnolia case, however, does not
proceed on the theory that the Texas award purported to adjudicate
the rights and duties of the parties under the Louisiana law or to con-
27. For other possible situations see instances cited in the dissenting opinion of
Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202, 213, 216-218, 54 Sup. Ct. 181, 185-I86, I86-
188, 78 L. Ed. 269, 276-277, 278-279 (933) ; Moore and Oglebay, loc. cit. supra note
1S, at 577-605.
28. See Hilpert and Cooley, loc. cit. supra note I8.
29. There may be additional contactual facts, such as residence of the employer
and employee and duration of employment, which are of varying significance.
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trol persons or the courts in Louisiana by the application of the Texas
act. In fact it dismissed this as irrelevant because Texas was without
power to give extra-territorial effect to its laws.30 Rather, it regarded
the employee as having but one cause of action for which there were
two remedies. Resort to one of the remedies precluded the other.
There was but one cause of action because "The grounds of recovery
are the same in one state as in the other-the injury to the employee
in the course of his employment." There were not two causes of action
"merely because Louisiana law authorizes compensation, and in a dif-
ferent measure than does Texas, or because the jurisdiction of the
court of one state depends on the place of injury and that of the other
on the place of the employment contract, " ., 1
These conclusions raise some serious doubts. The decisions in
the Alaska Packers and Pacific Employers cases appear to be incom-
patible with the thesis that the grounds of recovery in the state of hiring
and the state of employment are identical. Of course, an injury in
the course of employment gives rise to a right to compensation. But,
if that were all that were shown and required there could be recovery
only under the act of the state of injury, which, of course, is not the
case. The cornerstone of the two decisions allowing either the state
of injury or the state of hiring to apply its act is that each state may
legislate as to events occuring within its borders and apply those laws
to such events in disregard of the laws of another state. Each deci-
sion carefully points to the facts in each state which made its act appli-
cable. And, as already indicated, the factual grounds for recovery in
each state are not the same.3 Nor do those differences in fact merely
determine the jurisdiction of the court of each state. The fact differ-
ences are the determinants of the substantive law applicable for decid-
ing the rights and liabilities of the litigants; they determine the choice
of law required under the federal constitution just as the significant
operative facts in a tort or contract conflict of laws problem are used
to fashion the appropriate rule of reference. The majority points out
that the extent to which a forum shall apply in its own courts a rule
of law of another state is itself a question of local law of the forum
and that merely because a compensation or tort action is transitory
30. Citing New York Life Insurance Company v. Head, 234 U. S. i49, 58 L. Ed.
1259 (1914) ; Home Insurance Company v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397, 50 Sup. Ct 338, 74 L.
Ed. 926 (I93O).
31. 32o U. S. 430, 444, 64 Sup. Ct. 2o8, 216, 88 L. Ed. 16i, 169 (i943).
32. See Clark, The Code Cause of Action (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 817; i MOE AND
FRIEDMAN, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 145 et seq. "The term 'cause of action'
is used in many different situations, . . . The meaning of the term is not necesarily
the same in all these situations. This Chapter deals with the extent of the application
of the principle that a controversy which has been determined by a judgment shall not
be relitigated. This Title deals with the question what constitutes a claim or cause
of action in the application of this principle." RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS (i942) 239.
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does not mean that there is a different cause of action in every forum
in which suit may be brought. However, there is this significant dif-
ference: in the workmen's compensation conflict of laws problem, if
suit were in a forum other than the state of injury or employment, the
rights of the employee would be governed by the law of two states,
since there are two rules of reference, simultaneously applicable.
Do the decisions in Williams v. North Carolina 33 or Chicago,
R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Schendel 4 necessitate the conclusion reached by
the majority? 3' In a way, the Williams case presents an analogous
problem: a conflict of laws situation where the rights and liabilities of
the litigants are subject to the control of two states. However, as Mr.
Justice Douglas points out, "Such questions of status, i. e., marital
capacity, involve conflicts between the policies of two States which are
quite irreconcilable as compared with the present situation." 36 A
divorce granted by the state of domicile of one of the spouses termi-
nates the marriage and this cannot be reconciled with another state's
regarding the marriage as still existing through a prosecution for
bigamy. The two policies cannot be accommodated. An award for
compensation supplementing a previous award does not negate the
latter. That the second recovery is only for the difference is an
express recognition of the first award. And, because of this device
there cannot be a double recovery. When the employee's total com-
pensation equals the maximum amount permissible under either act he
has been fully compensated and that is all to which he is entitled.3 7
The two dissenting opinions also distinguish the Schendel case. There,
actions were instituted under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and
the state corripensation statute. Recovery under the former could only
be had if the employee was engaged in interstate commerce. The action
on the state statute was the first to proceed to judgment. In that
suit the issue of whether the deceased was engaged in intrastate or
interstate commerce was litigated and the court found that the de-
ceased had been engaged in intrastate commerce. This finding became
res judicata of the issue of interstate commerce and precluded recovery
33. 317 U. S. 287, 63 Sup. Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. 279 (1942). Mr. Justice Jackson
concurred in the majority opinion, 320 U. S. 430, 446, 64 Sup. Ct. 208, 217, 88 L. Ed.
161, 170 (1943), regarding himself bound by the majority decision in the Williams
case, where he dissented. 317 U. S. 287, 311, 63 Sup. Ct. 207, 219, 87 L. Ed. 279, 293
(1942).
34. 270 U. S. 611, 46 Sup. Ct. 42o, 7o L. Ed. 757 (1926).
35. Certiorari in the Magnolia case was granted to resolve an apparent conflict
with these two cases.
36. 320 U. S. 430, 447, 64 Sup. Ct. 208, 218, 88 L. Ed. i61, i7i (1943).
37. But cf. Rounsaville v. Central R. Co., 87 N. J. L. 371, 374, 94 Atl. 392, 393
(i). ". . . recovery of compensation in two states is no more illegal, and is not
necessarily more unjust, than recovery upon two policies of accident or life insurance."
See also dissenting opinion in Salvation Army v. Industrial Commission, 219 Wis. 343,
263 N. W. 349 (i935).
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under the Federal Act. The theory of the Schendel case would have
been applicable in the Magnolia case if- in the Texas proceedings the
issue of whether Hunt was injured or was an employee of the Magnolia
Petroleum Corporation had been litigated and a finding made adverse
to the employee.38 However, that was not the case.39 Nothing adjudi-
cated in Texas precluded a further action under the Louisiana act.
The Texas act barred recovery in Texas if there had been a prior
award elsewhere. The Louisiana act did not. But Texas neither said
an award in Texas barred an award elsewhere nor could it do so.
This the Supreme Court has now held results from the impact of the
full faith and credit clause; the two remedies provided by the two
acts are mutually exclusive.
Apart from legal theory, the majority opinion presents another
serious difficulty. If the employee were certain always to seek recov-
ery under the act which permits the larger award, then as a practical
matter the decision of the majority would not make much difference.
However, the facts of the Magnolia case itself demonstrate that the
injured employee is not always in a position to so act. He may well
be jockeyed into a position, either through ignorance on his part and
the superior knowledge of the insurer,4" as in the Magnolia case, or
through a procedural device which allows the employer to initiate pro-
ceedings, as in the Schendel case,41 where he will be compelled to take
the lesser of the two recoveries possible. In a country of forty-eight
states with widely varying economic and -social standards, the differ-
ence which the employee is thus precluded from recovering may well
frustrate the very purpose of workmen's compensation. Perhaps under
the dissenters' view the employer will be put to two lawsuits. The
chances are, however, that a different insurer will defend in each case.
Be that as it may, the conclusive answer to this is that one who con-
38. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS (1942) § 68.
39. See Hoffman v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 74 F. (2d) 227 (C. C. A.
2d, 1934), where a plea of res judicata based on a Connecticut award was held inad-
missible in a suit under the Federal act because an express adjudication in the Con-
necticut proceeding that the accident occurred in intrastate commerce was lacking.
40. "Confined to a hospital he [Hunt] was told that he could not recover com-
pensation uniess he signed two forms presented to him. . . . there was printed on
each of the forms 'in small type' the designation 'Industrial Accident Board, Austin,
Texas.' To get his compensation Hunt signed the forms. . . . Returning to his
home in Louisiana, Hunt apparently discovered that his interests would be more fully
protected under Louisiana law and notified the insurer of an intention to claim under
the statute of that state." After that the insurer stopped payment and notified the
Board in Texas which proceeded to make an award in the absence of Hunt, although
with due notice to him. 320 U. S. 430, 450, 451, 64 Sup. Ct. 2o8, 219, 88 L. Ed. I6i,
172-173 (943).
41. In the latter case the surviving widow started suit under the Federal act. There-
after the railway company instituted a proceeding before the Iowa Industrial Commis-
sion and the widow was made a party. Later she appeared and contested the applica-
bility of the state act.
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ducts business in more than one state must comply with the multi-state
legal consequences which attach.
III.
Can the effect of the decision be avoided by state legislation or
judicial decision? One possibility is that a state say that an employee
may recover under its laws even though there has been a previous
recovery for the same injury in another state. The Court expressly
left open this question in the Magnolia case. It is at best difficult to
see what bearing this has on the issue. The full faith and credit pro-
visions of the statute 42 require such faith and credit to be given to
judgments as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from
which they are taken. They do not require that such faith and credit
be given a judgment that the state of rendition gives to a judgment of
another state. Nevertheless, the question expressly having been left
open, it offers at least a temporary avenue of escape. Of course a
state could say an award is not res judicata, but obviously no state
would find it to its interest to say that once an award is recovered it
is not final but may be relitigated. A third, and perhaps more feasible
suggestion, is that legislation be enacted declaring that upon applica-
tion by an employee who desires to avail himself of the benefits of
another act, pending proceedings shall be stayed; or, if an award has
already been granted, it may be revoked and vacated,43 subject to re-
payment of compensation already paid and to reinstatement if compen-
sation elsewhere is denied. Thus, if the employee finds it to his advan-
tage to sue in Snother state, the prior award could be removed as a
barrier to a second proceeding.
Finally, there is one more possibility. Congress, by excepting
workmen's compensation awards from the provisions of the statute
implementing the full faith and credit clause, could leave the matter to
each state to decide for itself.
42. 28 U. S. C. A. § 687 (1928).
43. Cf. Lynde v. Lynde, I81 U. S. 183, 21 Sup. Ct. 555, 45 L. Ed. 81o (i9or) ; Sis-
tare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1, 30 Sup. Ct. 682, 54 L. Ed. 9o5 (191o) ; RESTATEiENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS (934) §§ 434, 435, 446, 464. Cf. Yarborough v. Yarborough, 29o
U. S. 202, 54 Sup. Ct. 181, 78 L. Ed. 269, 9o A. L. R. 924 (1933).
